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ST A T E S ARE D E S IG N IN G F O R SA FETY
In this presentation we plan to concentrate on the design aspects of
the Yellow Book Safety Review. Design means many things to many
people. W e in some way design almost every aspect of the highway,
we design roadbeds, hardware, roadsides, geometries, traffic control
devices, drainage and many other things. I ’ll try to cover as many aspects
of designs as I can, but Fm sure it won’t be all inclusive.
I think one of the conclusions drawn as a result of this review was
that generally, state design standards, specifications and policies are
current and reflect safety considerations. During the office reviews we
found very little to criticize in present design policies, and we thought
that the states were in pretty good shape. Now that isn’t to say that we
didn’t find obsolete standards related to safe design policies, we did,
but this is a fast changing technology, and generally the states were
already aware of the latest developments and were in the process of at
least studying possible changes.
S T A T E S ’ SA FETY D ESIG N S D IF F E R
I might point out that a very consistent comment made in all but
one of the 22 states visited by the headquarters office task force was that
“our state is unique.” This statement was usually made during the
first five minutes of the meeting and much of the rest of the meeting was
devoted to supporting the uniqueness of the state. There was plenty of
evidence that the differences exist; as an example, in 22 states:
(1) Fifteen used a turndown guardrail terminal and there were
12 different designs.
(2) W e have pictures of about 50 different types of bridge rails and
as many different transitions to guardrails as there are bridge
rails.
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(3) There were over seven different designs for breakaway sign
supports.
(4) There were no two states with the same design for median pier
protection.
SA FE T Y D E SIG N ER S N E E D F E E D B A C K A C C ID E N T ANALYSES
T he review task force did not question the fact that different States
have different designs for the same type of protection, but we are con
cerned over the lack of knowledge on the part of the designers on how
well these various designs perform. It was a rare case when a designer
had heard the results of an impact with one of his design features, either
good or bad. T he designer needs feedback on how well his designs are
performing—usually he is not getting it. Another point along the same
line, of the 22 states visited, only two had ever performed any crash
tests on unique designs used in their states. I know crash testing is
expensive and not necessary in every case, but if we are developing
unique designs that have not been crash tested and we do not monitor
their performance, how do we know if they work ?
But most problems identified during the review were not caused by
the design standards on policies themselves, but by how they were often
interpreted and applied in the field. In some cases the original design
concept was modified or changed during construction. In other cases
they were “handbooked” into place with adverse results. Sometimes
different policies were in conflict.
Again, I would like to point out the importance of using accident
data in analyzing the safety performance of design policies. I t ’s often
stated that accident data was not available to analyze this performance.
In some cases this was true, in all cases it takes some effort to acquire,
but it’s worth the effort.
Let me give you an example of the use of accident data. In one of
the states reviewed, there was a design practice to berm the median on
approaches to elephant traps, and to protect an errant vehicle from
running into the steep side slope of the berm ; guardrails were placed on
either side of the bermed area parallel to the road. The review team
concluded that this design would have a tendency to redirect a vehicle
traversing the berm area into the rear of the guardrail. Those familiar
with the area indicated that they had never heard of such an instance
occurring. As a result, one evening we reviewed the raw accident
reports occurring within a two-year period for a five-mile section of the
freeway. Four injury accidents and one fatal accident had occurred at
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the bermed areas during this period, all had run up on the berms and
been deflected into the back of the guardrail. It became obvious that
this policy needed to be changed, and it only took about 20 minutes to
analyze the raw reports. Yet up to this point the designers were confident
that the berm-guardrail design was acceptable; because no knowledge of
accidents was considered positive information, there was no problem.
There is at least one other area where monitoring accident data to
determine design performance may have saved us a lot of design contro
versy. This is the Texas twist problem. There are literally hundreds of
thousands of these terminal designs on our highways today. There has
been one crash test series that shows that if this design is hit in a critical
location it can flip a vehicle onto its back. Admittedly, this is a relatively
rare occurrence, or is it? W hat do the accident records show for this
design? No one knows. If this design had been monitored through
accident reports in the past, it certainly would have been helpful, and
we would have a much easier time of deciding what to do about it today.
In summary, the task force felt strongly that accident reports can and
must be used to verify designs and that designers should be responsible
for this.
D ESIG N ER S A N D C O N S T R U C T O R S N E E D
T O C O M M U N IC A T E
Aside from the accident report use problem for safe highway design,
there are a number of instances when somehow communications between
design and construction personnel failed. Following are some photo
graphs that show this communications failure. [Editors note—the text
of this report continues in the figure captions of Figures 1 through 11.]

Figure 1. Note that while this guardrail is properly designed, it doesn’t
extend to the point of need.
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Figure 2. It is difficult or almost impossible to determine all hazardous
fixed objects along the roadway that will be shielded by a barrier system.
Often the design deflection of the system seems to be forgotten in its
placement. In modifying guardrail terminals to the BCT system this ap
peared to be a constant problem.

Figure 3. Another problem often encountered was the placement of bar
riers for no discernible reason. Barrier design is almost impossible to do
on a plan sheet. It requires field inspection, and an unneeded barrier is
also a hazard.

Figure 4. Some barrier designs such as the cable guardrail have desirable
safety performance characteristics but are real maintenance problems. An
inadequately maintained barrier is often more hazardous than no protection
at all.
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Figure 5. Obstructions such as curbs in front of guardrails negate the
entire concept of the safe barrier system.

Figure 6. Some bridge rails are obviously strong enough to withstand a
major impact, but are not designed to safety redirect the vehicle properly
or prevent snagging.

Figure 7. One of the major gaps between design and construction were
observed in problems relating to signing. The most reoccurring problem
observed in 19 or 22 states was the low sign panel; even when sign panels
were not low, hingepoints sometimes were.
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Figure 8. Design policies which required signs to be placed close to the
edge of the roadway in otherwise clear recovery areas were also a problem.

Figure 9. Single direction breakaway sign supports are fine for the main
line of most freeways but should be modified where multidirectional hits
can occur.
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Figure 10. An area of major concern to the review team was the lack of
a design policy for sidewalks in urban areas. Many states have no design
policy for sidewalks in urban areas. Many states have no design criteria
whatsoever for warranting sidewalks. This results in poor pedestrian ac
commodation. Designers appeared to have often forgotten about the pedes
trian. This results in noncontinuous sidewalks and sidewalks obstructed
by highway hardware.

Figure 11. Impact attenuator design was usually adequate. However, in
many cases it was designed to either shield a specific fixed object without
regard to other hazards at the same location, or the design did not take
into account conditions on the approach that would minimize the safety
effectiveness of the cushions.
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Those are specific examples of the design problems we encountered
during the review. There were a number of other general design policies
which at least inhibited the safety of the highway environment. I would
like to take a brief moment to discuss these.
The first area I would like to discuss is strict conformance to the
30-foot clear zone. See Figure 12. If designers were to consider their

Figure 12

design from the standpoint of safety performance, I doubt that anybody
in good conscience would follow the absolute 30-foot rule. A number
of States have a policy of requiring breakaway designs within 30 feet
of the travelled way but allow nonbreakaway devices beyond the 30foot zone. This policy often results in pulling hazardous fixed objects

Figure 13
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Figure 14

to the very edge of the clear zone when there is no necessity for the
placement there at all.
Second, it was obvious to the members of the review teams that many
of the major repaving projects reviewed were designed in a vacuum or
at least without considering the impact of the repaving on the other
safety features of the highway. See Figures 13, 14, 15. This resulted
in low barrier heights and hazardous dropoffs. W e realize that designers
are sometimes not involved in safety upgrading projects for repaving
only. But designers are certainly involved in safety upgrading projects
requiring modification to existing highway hardware design. In a
number of cases the review teams observed such things as modified
transitions that attached to substandard bridge rails. If the barrier is
worth installing, it’s worth designing right. There are many instances
where general design specifications were used as a substitute for specific

Figure 15
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designs. This led to some very strange-looking highway hardware in the
field, such as guardrails placed behind utility poles.
Probably the most disturbing design deficiency noted by the review
teams was the use of barrier curbs on new projects. See Figure 16. It is
inconceivable to me that any designer concerned with the safety of the
driving public would purposely install a barrier curb between the edge
of the roadway and the clear recovery area. The curb defeats the entire
concept of the clear recovery zone. The purpose of the recovery zone

Figure 16

is to allow an errant driver to gain control of his vehicle while traversing
the clear area and return safely to the highway. Placing a curb in front
of the clear recovery area often causes the driver to completely lose
control of his vehicle or in some cases damage his steering so that the
driver can never regain control. The curb also negates the safety per
formance of crash cushions, barrier rails, and in some cases breakaway
supports. L et’s get rid of those curbs, or if it’s absolutely necessary that
a curb be present, let’s at least make it mountable.
H O W T O IM P R O V E SA FETY D ESIG N S
So what will be the impact of the F H W A safety review on design?
A t this point I don’t really know. F H W A has established an imple
mentation task force to develop specific corrective action for the prob
lems noted in the review. They are still in the process of developing
these actions. However, I personally think there are a number of things
that designers can do that would easily overcome many of the problems
discussed today.
Designers M u st Be Aware of Desired Performance
First the designer must be aware of the desired safety performance
of his design. M ost design specifications do not really address this issue
and somewhere in the design process it appears that we lose sight of
the basic intent of the design on some occasions. I think the best method
to overcome this problem is to establish more performance standards
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rather than specifications. L et’s check the performance of the designed
end product rather than the spec’s and use proven designs to accom
plish this.
Train Constructors and Maintenance Personnel
T he second and probably more serious cause of most of the design
problem is the inappropriate modification or adoption of the design
during construction. Unfortunately, the designer can’t afford to take
the time to oversee the detailed construction of his design. T he construc
tion personnel must have knowledge of what the design is to accomplish
and how it is supposed to perform. This will take training, and F H W A
is in the process of working on a series of training programs to give
construction and maintenance personnel just this type of knowledge.
This is a start, but I think the designer must still periodically check on
the final product to insure that its constructed as designed.
Designers Should Evaluate Performance of Design
Finally and most importantly, the designer must become involved in
evaluating the safety performance of his designs. The designer will have
to initiate this action—no one is going to supply him with accident data
unless he asks for it, and unless he requests specific types of information,
the information gatherers won’t know what information to collect. I
would recommend that designers should conduct performance reviews
of their own to detect possible safety problem areas. Monitor and
analyze the accidents in these specific areas and modify standards ac
cordingly. W hatever happened to the design review team? No one
seems to use them anymore. Here is a good place to start.
SUM M ARY
In summary, we are not doing a bad job in safety design, but there
are still some nagging problems. W ith a little more attention and con
cern in safety performance, we can do even a better job— and we should.
I t’s human lives that may be in the balance.

